Algunos críticos del libre mercado y de los teóricos económicos que favorecen la economía de libre mercado sostienen que éstos simplifican demasiado la complejidad de la realidad social, y les atribuyen la idea de que los precios son los únicos instrumentos que sirven para la coordinación social. Los críticos dicen que no, que hay más mecanismos coordinadores como las costumbres, reglas, etc. Bueno, no sé si la crítica será certera hacia la economía neoclásica, pero no lo es hacia la economía austriaca.
Cito de The Economics of Time and Ignorance, de Mario Rizzo y Gerald O’Driscoll:
Pag. 106: Sobre los precios como señales transmisoras de información y el resto de señales distintas a los precios, que también sirven para este propósito.
What of the idea that prices guide behavior? First, prices are useful guides or signals because, and insofar as. they reveal discrepancies, previous maladjustments, and errors. It surely misses the point to ask if they are now “correct.” Prices reveal what people want relatively more urgently now, and in the future, not what they would want in a hypothetical and unattainable equilibrium. No known system accomplishes the latter, and it is pointless if not misleading to make this a normative reference point.
Second, prices and markets function as part of a social system, not in isolation. A social system generates many kinds of signals and rules besides prices. Unless all these other guides are superfluous, it is erroneous to suggest that prices alone are sufficient guides. A theory of passive response to prices and only to prices is not a theory of human action, but a physics of automatons.
Nonprice constraints are as much part of a decentralized economy as are the prices they help to generate. These constraints are reference frameworks and orientation points, in terms of which actors form expectations. Prices are formed on markets composed of contracts, rules, and customs, which are part of the constraints and basis for observed behavior.
… much of the focus of the applied literature involves casting suspicion on al1 nonprice constraints on behavior (e.g. resale pricc maintenance). There is a presumption against them, and agents must justify their existence. We think this attitude follows from the presumption that prices “ought to” al1ocate resources, becausc they do so in perfect1y competitive models. Not prices but people allocate resources, and flesh and blood human actors depend on all these nonprice variables in their decision-making.